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Abstract 
This paper investigates prospects of a currency union in East Asia, focusing on trade 
and financial integration occurring in the region. We find, based on a dynamic factor 
model, regional common shocks have been quantitatively important for output 
variations in the Asian economies. We expect that continuing trade integration in the 
region will lead to further synchronization of business cycles, thereby encouraging East 
Asian countries to create a currency union in the region. In contrast to trade, however, 
financial liberalization in East Asia tends to lead to more global integration, rather than 
regional integration, of the financial systems, and thereby is not likely to develop 
favorable conditions for forming a regional currency union among East Asian countries.   
                                                 
*This paper was prepared as a background paper for the Asian Development Bank’s “Study on 
Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia” (TA6000-REG). We are grateful for research 
assistance from Woongjai Baek.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper assesses the feasibility and desirability of a common currency arrangement 
in East Asia. We examine empirically whether East Asia satisfies preconditions for an 
optimum currency area, and then discuss prospects of forming a successful currency 
union among East Asian countries in the near future, especially focusing on trade and 
financial integration occurring in the region.  
A number of studies have shown that the de facto currency pegs against the US 
dollar was one of the major causes of recent financial crises in East Asia. After the 
eruption of the crises, East Asian countries were forced to abandon the dollar peg 
system and adopt a floating exchange rate. An important question is whether the new 
exchange rate system gives enough confidence to these economies, and thus in the long 
run it can serve as a permanent choice to them. Although it is too early to judge the role 
of the flexible exchange rate in the post-crisis performance of the East Asian economies, 
much concern has raised on the undesirable aspects of increased instability in the 
foreign exchange market.  Further, critics say that contrary to expectations, the free-
floating system has not clearly enabled East Asian countries to retain their monetary 
autonomy. 
This post-crisis experience has led many researchers to advocate alternative 
exchange rate arrangements that can enhance stability and credibility in the exchange 
rate. Williamson (1999) and Dornbusch and Park (2000) advocate a common-basket 
exchange rate peg for the East Asian region. They argue that East Asian countries can 
expect to stabilize the overall export competitiveness by pegging their currencies to a 
basket of the yen, dollar and euro. This proposal seems to receive supports from many 
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Japanese government officials and economists. Other prominent U.S. economists such 
as Barro (2001) and McKinnon (1999) also proposed a currency union adopting the US 
dollar as a common currency.  
This paper makes an assessment of the feasibility and desirability of a currency 
union in East Asia. The theory of common currency area (OCA) lists many important 
criteria for a common currency area in a region. They include the symmetry of shocks 
across countries, trade and financial integration, and labor mobility and wage flexibility. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1999), and Baek and Song (2001) argue that on pure OCA 
grounds East Asia is a plausible candidate for a common currency area, as the Euro area. 
We extend their work by improving the methodology of assessing the symmetry of 
shocks. We consider a model in which output of an economy is influenced by three 
different shocks- global, regional, and country-specific. The importance of a common 
regional shock would provide a case for a regional common currency.  
After decomposing shocks among the world common, the region common and 
the country-specific shocks for each economy, we will evaluate the feasibility of a 
common currency area in East Asia by comparing the estimates between Asian and 
European countries.  The greater the size of the region common shocks is, the more 
desirable it will be for that area to form a common currency arrangement.  This paper 
then investigates the determinants of the relative size of the region common shocks 
across countries.  We investigate how variables such as intra-region trade, industrial and 
trade structure, and income difference have effects on the size of common shocks 
among countries.   
Given the extent to which the East Asian countries have managed to liberalize 
their current and capital account transactions over the last decades, an interesting 
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question is whether the continuing trade and financial integration would increase market 
pressures for forming a common currency arrangement in the region. We assess the 
recent development of trade and financial integration in East Asia and discuss the 
perspectives for a currency union.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical model that 
we use to analyze output co-movements across countries. Section 3 presents the 
estimates of each economy’s output variances decomposed by the world common, the 
region common and the country-specific shocks. We use these estimates to compare the 
size of regional common shocks in East Asia to that in European countries. Section 4 
investigates the determinants of output co-movements in the region. We discuss 
perspectives for an Asian currency union in relation to trade integration among East 
Asian countries in Section 5. Section 6 will focus on the implications of capital market 
integration for a currency union in East Asia. Concluding remarks follow in Section 7. 
 
 
2. An Empirical Specification of Output Co-Movements 
 
As pointed by Mundell (1961), the major costs of joining a currency union are 
the loss of independent monetary policy.  The costs are, however, significantly lessened 
if business cycles are synchronized among the member countries, because in this case 
the common monetary policy can do as good as the individual monetary policy.   Hence, 
to judge the costs of joining a currency union, it has been crucial to measure how 
asymmetric shocks are across candidate countries.   
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In the OCA literature the degree of how symmetric shocks is mainly measured 
by a simple correlation between countries.  Usually an anchor country is picked up, and 
the correlation is calculated between a country and the anchor country.  We believe that 
this approach has some disadvantages in the following reasons.  First, since we are 
eventually interested in the net benefits of adopting a common monetary policy across 
economies in the region, the degree of region-wide co-movements, rather than bilateral 
ones, seem to be a more appropriate measure. Second, the simple correlation does not 
offer the sources of the shocks: it may be the third factor such as the world common 
shocks that induce a high correlation between countries. Then forming a currency union 
solely based on the regional context could be misleading, and more globalized 
arrangement would be desirable.  The third problem with using bilateral measures in 
Asia is that no single country plausibly offers a regional anchor.  In Europe, Germany 
has been playing the pivotal role in acting as a center country in shaping EMU, however, 
in Asia, it would be difficult to expect Japan to play a similar role.   
We set up a model in which the world economy consists of many different 
regions and each region consists of many different countries.  We interpret that the 
movement of an aggregate output in each country j is decomposed into three 
components: a world common component, a region common component and a country-
specific component.  The world common component influences on every country in the 
world, while the region common component influences only on the countries that 
belong to the same region.  The influence of the country-specific component is 
restricted to the specific country.  For example, the output of Korea fluctuates due to 
shocks to the world economy, shocks to Asian region or Korea-specific shocks. 
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The above interpretation of the world economy can be described by a dynamic 
factor model.  The dynamic factor model has been used by many studies, as it was 
popularized by Stock and Watson (1991).  Other studies based on the dynamic factor 
model include Geweke (1977), Geweke and Singleton (1980), Sargent and Sims (1977) 
and Gregory, Head and Raynauld (1997). 
Let rjtY  denote a measure of aggregate output at time t for country j belonging 
to region r.  There are three regions considered: Asia, Europe and North America 
regions.  If r=1, that country belongs to Asia, if r=2, it belongs to Europe, and if r=3, it 
belongs to North America.  Let tW  be an unobservable component of world economic 
activity common to all the countries and rtR  be an unobservable component common to 
each country belonging to the same region r.  We will refer to these as the world 
common and the region common factors.  Further we assume that the output series for 
each country is decomposed into three separate components: 
 
jt
r
trjtwj
r
jt RWY εαα ++=     (1) 
 
Here jtε  represents a country specific factor to country j.  The coefficients, wjα  and rjα , 
are impact coefficients on factors, tW  and 
r
tR , for country j.  The fact that we allow the 
impact coefficients to differ across countries implies that the world common and the 
region common factors influence each country with different degrees of magnitude. 
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Following Stock and Watson (1991) we assume that the three factors follow a 
stationary univariate autoregressive process.  More specifically we further assume that 
these processes are all first-order as follows: 
 
  Wttwt WW ηρ += −1      (2) 
  1
r r R
t r t rtR Rρ η−= +      (3) 
  1jt j jt jt
εε ρ ε η−= +      (4) 
 
We also assume that all the errors, Wtη , Rrtη  and jtεη in equations (2), (3) and (4) are 
uncorrelated both serially and contemporaneously.  These are the fundamental sources 
of the shocks in the economy. 
The assumption that the errors are contemporaneously uncorrelated implies that 
there is no explicit co-movement among factors.  This assumption is needed to identify 
the factors in our model.  
Before the raw data are applied to the model, they are detrended to generate 
cyclical components using a standard method: the raw data are first-differenced in 
logarithms and then cycles in growth rates are analyzed.  We do not adopt another 
standard method, the Hodrick-Prescott filter, that decomposes each series into trend and 
cyclical components because the series are annual and rather short. 
There are two additional considerations to be made before the actual estimation 
is performed.  First, for all detrended series, the sample mean is removed and the 
variance is standardized to one.  This is necessary for all series to receive the equal 
weights in estimating the common factors.  Since the estimation is obtained by 
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minimizing the variance of country-specific errors, if the variance of the series is not 
equalized across countries, those countries with high variances can overly influence the 
estimation procedure. By standardizing the series, we ensure that all the countries 
receive equal treatment irrespective of the size.  
Second, the variances of the error terms in equation (2) and (3), and the 
coefficients in equation (1) cannot be separately identified.  For example, by setting the 
variance of Wtη  arbitrarily smaller, the magnitude of the world common factor gets also 
smaller and this is balanced by a larger estimate of the coefficient, wjα  for all countries.  
We get around this problem by normalizing the variances of Wtη  and Rrtη  to unity.  Since 
this assumption affects the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, we rather base our 
quantitative analyses on variance decompositions. 
It is straightforward to transform the dynamic factor model consisting of 
equation (1), (2), (3) and (4) into the usual state-space/measurement equation form.  
This is a necessary step to implement the model in the empirical analyses.1   
Based on this model, we can measure the quantitative influence of the different 
common factors on fluctuations in aggregate output in each country.  Let fjS  denote the 
share of the variance of aggregate output for country j accounted for by variation in the 
factor , ,f w r ε= .  Under the assumption that the world common, the region common, 
and the country-specific factors are orthogonal, the variance of aggregate output for 
country j can be decomposed into three terms: 
                                                 
1 A detailed derivation and a numerical maximization method are explained in appendix A and 
B respectively. 
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where 2fσ , ,f w r=  and 2jεσ  are variances of the world, the region common, and the 
country-specific factors respectively.  Further the normalization to unity of the 
innovations to the world common, the region common, and the country-specific factors 
enables us to compute estimates of fjS  as follows: 
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where 2jησ  is the variance of jtεη .   
The estimates of the shares accounted for by the world common, the region 
common and the country-specific factors will play a crucial role in evaluating if 
countries belonging to the same region are eligible to form a regional currency 
arrangement.  Especially a large value of the share accounted for by the region common 
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factor – capturing how symmetric shocks are within a region - constitutes a prima facie 
case for a currency union.  For example, if a country exhibits a large value of the share 
accounted for by the region common factor, then its business cycle movement is largely 
synchronized to the region, indicating that a regional common monetary policy is more 
or less capable to respond to the disturbances.  On the other hand, if a country possesses 
a smaller value of the share accounted for by the region common factor and a larger 
value of that accounted for by the country-specific factor, it needs to rely more heavily 
on its own independent counter-cyclical monetary policy. 
 
 
3.  Decomposition of Output Variations in East Asian and European Countries 
 
For estimation of the model, annual data on real GDP are collected for 10 East Asian 
countries, 16 European countries and 2 North American countries over the period 1978-
99.  The East Asian countries include 5 ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) plus 5 other East Asian countries (Japan, China, 
Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan).2  The European countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Greece, Germany, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K.  The North American countries are 
the U.S.A and Canada.  All the data are drawn from IFS CD Rom (IMF).   
 A number of studies in the literature following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) 
decompose shocks between demand and supply shocks a la Blanchard and Quah (1989).  
                                                 
2 Six other ASEAN countries are excluded due to lack of data. 
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They argue that, if the structural shocks are not analyzed, information on the 
disturbances could be conflated with economies’ responses.  Further, they argue that 
supply shocks are more crucial disturbances to which independent monetary policy 
wishes to respond.  Our framework does not follow this convention based on the 
following reasons.  First, we see little justification that only supply shocks matter.  If 
supply shocks are permanent shocks, there may not be much room left for the policy 
maker to react to.  Further if demand shocks do not originate from policy 
implementations, the monetary policy authority may wish to counteract to these 
disturbances.  Second, supply shocks and demand shocks derived from the Blanchard-
Quah methodology are innovations that are serially independent.  Then we cannot 
impose any realistic dynamics on the shocks: the AR(1) dynamics imposed to the 
factors in equation (1) is inconsistent with this property of demand and supply shocks.  
 Considering that any important steps towards a currency union such as the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991 may have influenced on the nature of regional co-movement 
of output, we have divided the entire sample period into two sub-sample periods: 1978-
1990 and 1990-1999.3   In table 1, shares of variances accounted for by the world 
common, the region common and the country-specific factors are illustrated for Asian 
(table 1A) and European (table 1B) countries for both periods.  Columns from 2 to 5 
correspond to the former period and those from 6 to 9, the latter period.  In column 2 
and 6, the volatility of growth rates of output for each country is reported for each 
                                                 
3 Frankel and Rose (1998) have shown that increased international trade induces more tightly 
correlated business cycles across countries.  It follows, then, measures adopted to enhance a 
currency union, by endogenously increasing international trade among the relevant countries, 
the share of regional co-movement can be endogenously increased. 
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period.  The volatility of output reported in column 2 and 6 are decomposed into shares 
of variances in the next three columns.  These shares correspond to the measures 
calculated based on equation (6) in section 2.  The negative sign in parentheses implies 
that the coefficient multiplied to the factors, wjα  or rjα , is negative, indicating that the 
output is moving along the common factor, but in different directions.  Note, however, 
that the absolute values of the shares sum to one for each country.  In the last row, the 
average volatility and the average (absolute) shares of variances accounted for by the 
three factors are reported for each region.  
In terms of volatility, the size is much larger in the Asian region.  In the former 
period the average volatility for the Asian countries (3.113) is about 1.75 times more 
volatile than that of the European countries (1.770).  In the latter period, it increases in 
both regions, the difference widening in the latter period, so that the average volatility in 
the Asian region (3.888) is almost twice as large as that in the European region (1.983). 
This shows that the Asian region consists of more volatile countries and, if this is due to 
non-policy related shocks, there needs for more active implementation of monetary 
policies.   
 In the Asian region, the share of variances in output accounted for by 
fluctuations in the country-specific factor significantly decreases in the latter period. 
This decrease is compensated mostly by the increase in the share of variances accounted 
for by the region common factor, while that accounted for by the world common factor 
also increases.  We can observe qualitatively the same phenomenon for the European 
region: the shares of variances accounted for by the world common and the region 
common factors increase at the expense of that accounted for by the country-specific 
factor.  However, the decrease in the share of variances accounted for by the country-
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specific factor is relatively more absorbed by the increase in that accounted for by the 
world common factor rather than by the region common factor.    
The finding that the world common factor gets more important in the latter 
period is consistent with the belief that, as time passes, since the world economy 
interacts more closely across countries, the importance of the world component 
becomes larger4.  Besides, the finding that the share of variances accounted for by the 
region common factor becomes larger in the latter period can be also understood in a 
similar manner.  However the fact that the importance of the region common factor 
reveals more distinctively in the Asian region in the latter period is somewhat surprising, 
because more efforts are believed to have been made in the European region towards 
integration, which should act to increase the role of the region common factor in the 
latter period.   
We believe that this finding can be explained based on the following two factors.  First, 
the European region was already significantly integrated in 1980s and the marginal 
increase in integration occurred in the second period was relatively small. Second, more 
importantly, the Asian crisis that occurred in the late 1990s influenced most Asian 
countries simultaneously, playing an important role of amplifying the region common 
factor.  Data in Table 1 shows that the most crisis-affected economies, such as Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand show higher degree of co-movements, while the least-
affected China and Singapore had very only negligible regional components. .5    
                                                 
4 Gregory, A.W., A.C. Head and J. Raynauld (1997) and Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2001) 
both find that the world common factor is an importance source of volatility in output.  
5 In order to control for the influence of the Asian crisis, we have also estimated the model 
based on the sample of two periods – 1978-1987 and 1988-1996- by excluding the crisis period 
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 While somewhat exaggerated by the Asian crisis, if focusing on the latter period, 
we find that the Asian region is even better prepared for the regional currency union: the 
share of the region common factor is over .5 on average, indicating that the regional co-
movement explains more than a half of the fluctuations in the individual country’s 
output.  Especially Indonesia (.888), Malaysia (.845), Korea (.792), Thailand (.604), 
Philippines (.585), most of them heavily influenced by the Asian crisis, show that their 
movement of output is closely linked to the region common factor.  
Similar findings, if not as strong as ours, have been made by a number of 
studies in the literature.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), based on a decomposition of 
shocks between demand and supply shocks, find that there is little difference between 
Europe and Asia.  Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999), using the OCA index developed in 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), find that the economies of East Asia would seem to 
be more or less as plausible candidates for a currency union as the members of the 
European Union.6 Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) also find that, while East Asian countries 
are less suited for a regional currency arrangement than Europe, the difference is not 
large.7  
                                                                                                                                               
after 1997. We find the share of regional common shocks in output variances decline 
substantially in the latter period, particularly in the crisis-hit Asian countries.  
6 Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) argue, however, that the Asian region lacks important 
institutions to implement a currency union, such as sound financial systems, political network, 
and a long history of integrationist tradition.    
7 On the other hand, Wyplosz (2001) and Chow and Kim (2000) argue less positively for the 
preconditions of East Asia to implement a currency union.   
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 Among 16 European countries, the degree of how tightly a single country 
belongs institutionally to the region significantly varies.  For example, ten countries 
have successfully joined EMU, three countries (Denmark, Sweden and the U.K) have 
decided to opt out, Greece was not qualified, and two countries (Switzerland and 
Norway) are not even EU members.  When we divide the European countries into EMU 
and non-EMU countries, some interesting observations arise.   In table 1.B, we can 
confirm that the six non-EMU countries are those that exhibit a lower share of the 
region common factor in both periods: Denmark ((-).0015, .0002), Greece 
(.2381, .2489), Norway (.0128, (-).0747), Sweden (.2472, .1191), Switzerland 
(.2148, .2718) and the U.K (.0528, (-).1486).8  Further, the 10 EMU countries generally 
show that the share of the region common factor is already large in the former period 
and gets even higher in the latter period: it increases in eight countries.   
 This pattern seems to show that the decision made by the 6 non-EUM countries, 
whether voluntary or not, is closely related to the OCA criteria.  Also, countries 
belonging to EMU have endogenously evolved to favor joining the common currency 
arrangement. 
 
 
4. Determinants of Output Co-Movements 
 
In the last section we examined output movements for a group of European and Asian 
countries to distinguish common from idiosyncratic disturbances. The estimation, based 
                                                 
8 The value appearing first in the parentheses corresponds to the former period and that 
appearing second, the latter period. 
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on the dynamic factor model, identified the existence of substantial common shocks 
across countries in the same region.  The region common shocks played a significant 
role in the fluctuations of national outputs both in the Euro and the Asian regions. 
This section investigates the determinants of the synchronization in business 
cycles of the economies. The decision on whether an economy joins a currency union 
involves the degree of output co-movements.  A difficult question is that the degree of 
output co-movements will be changed after a common currency is adopted.  For 
instance, as a currency union is formed in a region, intra-region trade will increase, 
subsequently leading to positive effects on the extent of output co-movements.9 Hence, 
the assessment of net benefits from a currency union involves predicting the output co-
movements that would apply after an adoption of a common currency in the region.   
A number of existing studies attempt to look at the determinants of common 
movements of business cycles. In the literature of international business cycles, trade is 
emphasized as the channel of output co-fluctuations.10 The spillover of aggregate 
demand shocks will tend to make business cycles correlated internationally since an 
increase in domestic spending will increase demand for both domestic and foreign 
goods. Greater integration in trade can also stimulate the spread of technology shocks 
across economies. Kraay and Ventra (2000) present another channel of spillovers 
through the change in relative prices of factors and products. A capital-augmenting 
                                                 
9 Rose (2000) finds that a currency union increases intra-regional trade.  Further, Frankel and 
Rose (1998) show that increased trade strengthens the extent of output co-movements across 
trading parties. 
10 Imbs (1999) provides a survey of the literature. 
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shock in one country results in relative scarcity of labor-intensive goods and thus, as 
much as they trade freely, leads to higher wage and employment throughout the world. 
Empirically, Canova and Dellas (1993) and Frankel and Rose (1998) find that more 
trade interdependence increases the extent of output co-movements.  
It is, however, ambiguous that the degree of output synchronization will always 
increase as countries trade more. If more trade leads to specialization in different 
industries, industry-specific shocks will make the outputs of two economies move in 
different directions, leading to less synchronization of business cycles (Eichengreen, 
1992 and Frankel and Rose, 1998). In this context, not just the size of trade but also the 
similarity of trade structure is considered to be important in explaining output co-
fluctuations. We expect that, when bilateral trade concentrates more on intra-industry 
trade than inter-industry trade, the tendency of synchronizing output fluctuations 
strengthens. 
On the other hand, several studies emphasize the similarity in production 
structure as an important determinant of co-movements of output. Industry-specific 
shocks can cause more business cycle synchronization among countries with similar 
production structures. Imbs (2001) provides evidence that the extent of specialization in 
industry structure has strong explanatory power for output co-movements in a sample of 
49 countries. Clark and van Wincoop (1999) find that for the US and EU regions more 
similarity in industry structure is associated with higher co-movement of employment. 
In this section we attempt to find what are the significant factors for the extent of 
synchronized business cycles in the European and Asian economies. We consider the 
role of the level of intra-region trade, the similarity of trade structure and industry 
structure on output co-movements.  
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We estimate the following regression: 
 
SRjt = a0 + a1*ln(Intra-region trade)jt +a2*ln(Trade structure similarity)jt 
+a3*ln(Industry structure similarity)j,t + a4* ln(difference in per capita GDP)j,t 
 + a5* ln(per capita GDP)j,t + gj,t         (8) 
 
The dependent variable, SRjt, is the fraction of an economy j’s output variations 
attributable to regional common shocks over the period t. Hence, this study contrasts 
other empirical studies that have used bilateral correlations as a measure of output co-
movements    
Intra-region trade is measured by the share of an economy’s trade with the rest 
of economies in the same region in total trade.11  To measure similarity in trade 
structure, we use the export similarity index. The index is defined as  
 ss ibia
i
−− ∑211 , 
where  sia  and sia denote the share of export for commodity i in countries a and b. Thus, 
the index measures the extent of similitude in the composition of total exports between 
a pair of economies.12 In order to measure each country’s trade structure similarity 
                                                 
11 Clark and van Wincoop (2000) use a trade intensity measure, which is the size of bilateral 
trade relative to per capita GDP. Our regression includes per capita GDP (as a log) separately 
and thus allows for an interpretation of the trade variable as an intensity measure. 
 
12 The sectoral classification is based on the three-digit SITC trade data. Total exports data does 
not include exports of (raw) agricultural products. When we use an alternative measure based on 
the sectoral classification at a more broad level including agriculture it has less explanatory 
power in the regressions. This may indicate that more trade dependence through intra-industry 
trade, rather than inter-industry trade, contributes to output comovements.  
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relative to the region’s average structure, we use an unweighted average of bilateral 
export similarity indices with the rest of the countries that belong to the same region.   
The index ranges between 0 (most dissimilar) and 1 (most similar). 
Following the same method, we construct an index of the similarity of industry 
structure, which compares the differences in the sectoral composition of GDP between 
an economy and the rest of economies in the region. We use data on gross valued added 
data classified at 10 broad categories (ISIC one digit).13 We have also constructed 
another measure based on detailed three digit manufacturing industries, but find it does 
not have any explanatory power (the results not reported). 
The regression includes the difference between an economy’s per capita GDP 
and the region’s average per capita GDP (as a log of the absolute value). The difference 
in per capita GDP can reflect the differences in economic structure including industrial 
and financial market structure. The log of per capita GDP itself is also included to 
control for differences in economic development that can affect asymmetry in business 
cycles.   
To minimize reverse-causality problems, all explanatory variables are measured 
at the beginning of each period (that is, 1980 and 1990). The regression is estimated 
allowing for random effects, which control for any unobserved country specific factors.  
                                                 
13 The 10 broad industries are agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; 
manufacturing; transportation and communications; electricity; wholesale and retail trade; 
finance and real estate; government; community and personal services and others. The data 
come from OECD’s National Accounts for European countries and Asian Development Bank’s 
database for Asian countries. 
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Table 2 displays the result of the basic regression that is applied to a total of 30 
observations for 15 European countries over the two ten-year periods from 1979 to 
1999.14  
Column 1 includes the index of industry structure similarity, the difference in 
per capita GDP, and the log of per capita GDP as explanatory variables.  It also adds the 
period dummy for the 1990s in order to control for shocks that were specific to the 
second period. The initial industry structure similarity has a positive correlation with 
output co-movements, which is consistent with the prediction that sharing the similar 
production structure results in high cycle synchronization. But, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant (1.681, s.e.=1.099), Given the estimate, an increase in the log of 
the index of industry structure similarity by one standard-deviation (0.047) increases the 
regional co-movement by 0.079, which is about 30% of a standard deviation. The 
coefficient on the difference of per capita GDP has a negative sign. Hence, the larger 
the difference in per capita income the smaller is the output co-movements. But the 
coefficient is not statistically significant (-0.075, s.e.=0.075). This result contrasts Imbs 
(2000) in which differences in per capita income have a strong negative impact on 
bilateral output correlation in a sample of 49 countries. The log of per capita GDP and a 
dummy for the 1990s enter positively, but they are statistically insignificant.  
Column 2 adds the intra-region trade share and the index of trade structure 
similarity along with per capita GDP and a dummy for the period of 1990s. Column 3 
includes all explanatory variables by adding the index of industry structure similarity 
and the per capita GDP difference. The result shows a strong and statistically significant 
                                                 
14 The sample does not include Switzerland because of lack of trade and industry structure data. 
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relation between initial intra-regional trade share and output co-movements. The 
coefficient in column 3 implies that an increase in the log of the intra-regional trade by 
0.15 (its standard deviation) raises the extent of co-fluctuations by 0.11.  
The test also finds a strong positive association between trade structure 
similarity and output co-movements, implying that countries with more similar trade 
structure in the initial year tend to have a higher degree of output co-movements in the 
subsequent period. An increase in the log of the trade structure similarity index by a 
one-standard deviation, 0.11, increases the extent of co-fluctuations by 0.18. 
The coefficient for per capita GDP has a significantly negative sign. Hence, an 
increase in per capita GDP leads to smaller output co-movement of an economy with 
the rest of the economies in the region. This result can be interpreted as follows. First, in 
our sample, relatively higher income countries tended to move more closely with world-
wide shocks, rather than region-wide shocks. In addition, when an economy grows 
faster than the rest of the economies, its business cycle becomes less synchronized than 
the others. The coefficient implies that an increase in the log of per capita GDP by 0.27 
(its standard deviation) decreases co-movements by 0.29.  
In Column 3, the inclusion of the industry structure similarity variable does not 
change the effects of trade variables on output co-movements. The estimated 
coefficients on the level of intra-region trade and the similarity of trade structure are still 
positive and statistically significant. On the contrary, the industry structure similarity 
and per capita income difference variables become statistically insignificant. This result 
is interesting in light of the findings of Imbs (2000). He argues that industry structure 
differences are more important than trade size for output co-movements. Our results 
indicate that trade factors play a more important role for output co-movements. Our 
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specification differs from his as we use the size of regional common components in 
national output variations instead of bilateral GDP correlations as a measure of output 
co-movements.  
Column 4 adds all explanatory variables except the dummy for the 1990s. The 
results are similar to those of column 3. Again, the index of similarity in the sectoral 
composition of aggregate output is not statistically significant for output co-movements. 
Table 3 reports the results of the same type of the regressions using the panel 
data set of 10 Asian economies over two periods. In columns (1)-(3), we find no 
statistically significant effects of intra-region trade share, and trade and industry 
structure similarity on output co-movements. But, the period dummy for the 1990s is 
highly statistically significant and positive. Thus, shocks that were specific to the 1990s 
explain a lot of variations of output co-movements in East Asian economies. This 
reflects the substantial change in the extent of cycle synchronization that occurred 
between two periods. One problem is that with this small sample size, the period-
specific dummy can wash out any effects of other explanatory factors on the over-time 
variations of the extent of output co-movement. For instance, the extent of intra-region 
trade and trade structure similarity had increased substantially in East Asian countries 
between the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 4.1), which could have some positive effects 
on output co-fluctuations. But, the dummy for the period of 1990s would take away 
substantial parts of these effects. Confirming this conjecture, in the column (4) where 
the dummy for the 1990s is excluded, the index of trade structure similarity becomes 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  In column (5) we replace the dependent variable 
by the estimates of the shares of regional common shocks for the 10 Asian countries 
that correspond to the periods 1978-1987, and 1988-1996. In this sample that the crisis 
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years are excluded, trade structure similarity becomes again statistically significant at 
the 5% significance level.  
 
5. Trade Integration and Currency Union in East Asia 
 
Countries that have more synchronized business cycles can benefit more from joining a 
currency union. Therefore, whether East Asia is suitable for an optimum currency area 
depends on how the national outputs would co-vary across economies when they adopt 
a common currency. The empirical evidence presented in section 4 shows that the level 
of intra-regional trade, and the similarity of trade structure turn out to be the most 
important factors for output synchronization.  
East Asia looks quite favorable for an OCA criterion in terms of its substantial 
degree of regional trade integration.  Table 4 presents intra-regional trade as a percent of 
total trade for the Asian and European economies. Intra-Asia trade is substantial. The 
share of intra-regional trade in total trade was about 51% on average in East Asia in 
2000. Hong Kong had the highest intra-region trade share of 64%, while Japan had the 
lowest of 38%. On average, the intra-region trade in East Asia was somewhat lower 
than the corresponding value for the Euro area, which was 66% in 2000. One reason for 
the relatively lower intra-region trade for Asian countries is that they trade relatively 
more with the United States than Euro countries do. The share of trade with the United 
States in total trade was about 19% for East Asian economies on average, contrasting to 
about 8% for Euro countries. In East Asia, the extent of intra-regional trade has shown 
an upward trend. It increased from 42% in 1980, to 48% in 1990 and 51% in 2000.  
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Integration of trade in East Asian region is expected to continue, and thus helps to 
reduce the extent of asymmetric shocks.   
The trade structures of East Asian economies have also become more similar 
over time. Table 5 shows trade structure similarity for East Asian and European 
countries. In 1980 the average of the similarity indices was 0.45 for 10 East Asian 
economies, which was far lower than the average for 15 European countries, 0.63. But, 
the similarity index in East Asia increased to 0.56 in 1990 and 0.64 in 2000. Hence, in 
terms of the extent of trade structure similarity East Asian countries are no less 
favorable than that in Euro countries. East Asian economies would benefit more from a 
currency union as their business cycles become more synchronized with more similar 
trade structure. 
It is likely that regional trade integration taking place in East Asia will increase 
market pressures for policy coordination for stable exchange rates among regional 
currencies, and eventually for adopting a common currency.   
 
6. Implications of Capital Market Integration for an Asian Currency Union 
 
In East Asia there has been a rapid increase in capital mobility as more advanced 
East Asian countries including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea have managed 
to deregulate and open their financial markets since the early 1990’s. A World Bank 
study (1997) uses three different measures to determinate the extent to which countries 
are financially integrated.  In constructing an overall index of integration the World 
Bank study uses the access to international financial markets, ability to attract private 
external financing, and the level of diversification of financing in terms of the 
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composition of financial flows.  According to the World Bank estimation, changes in 
the degree of financial integration were high in East Asian countries in early 1990s.  
The continuing financial integration taking place in East Asia raises a question 
of whether, like trade integration, it can bring the countries closer to monetary 
integration in the region.  This section will examine whether financial market 
integration could contribute to formation of a successful OCA in East Asia.   
Will a high degree of financial integration among a group of countries be a 
criterion for membership in an OCA?  That is, would countries with close financial 
linkages benefit from a common currency?  As in trade, a common currency brings 
benefits such as lower transactions costs and elimination of risks of exchange rate 
changes associated with trading in financial instruments between countries with 
different moneys.  More important, however, is that financial integration among a group 
of countries could facilitate formation of a common currency area for the group as it 
reduces the cost of adjustment to shocks to demand and supply through facilitating 
migration of capital in the long-run and cross-border financing of current account 
imbalances in the short-run.  
An important criterion for an OCA is the speed of adjustments to shocks. Even if 
disturbances are asymmetric across economies, the faster adjustment to shocks helps an 
economy to mitigate the costs of relinquishing independent monetary policy. In an 
economy where factor prices and price are not completely flexible, capital mobility can 
make real adjustments easier and less costly. In this regard, financial integration would 
increase the benefits from joining a common currency arrangement. However, there are 
counterbalancing effects of capital market integration on forming a currency union. As 
suggested by Kalemli-Ozcam, Sorensen and Yosha (2001), better income insurance 
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attained through greater capital market integration may induce higher specialization of 
production and hence larger asymmetric shocks across countries. This lower 
synchronization of business cycles due to stronger capital integration implies that 
candidate countries can be less willing to join a currency union 
 One important aspect is that, unlike trade integration, financial integration it is 
occurring at more global level rather than at regional level.  Given the extent to which 
the East Asian countries have managed to liberalize their capital account transactions in 
recent years, one might expect that financial markets of these economies may have 
become more closely linked with one another among East Asian countries than in the 
past.  However, the available empirical evidence does not provide clear evidence for the 
tendency that the East Asian countries have been more financially integrated among 
them.  Regionally integrated financial markets are yet to emerge and prospects for 
further financial integration in East Asia are not promising.  Empirical studies show that 
financial integration among Asian countries has not been substantial (see Park and Song, 
2001).  In contrast, the financial markets of the East Asian countries became 
increasingly integrated with the markets of developed countries (Glick and Hutchison, 
1990, Cheng and Mak, 1992, Bekaert and Harvey, 1995, and Kuen and Song, 1996).   
Considering tremendous evidence of home bias in equities at country level and 
tighter financial integration within a country, the fact that the same phenomenon does 
not occur at regional level is puzzling.  As recently surveyed by Lewis (1999), there are 
a number of reasons suggested in the literature to explain home bias at country level.  
First, domestic equities can provide a better hedge for risks that are specific to the home 
country.  For example, hedges against domestic inflation and hedges against wealth that 
is not traded in capital markets, such as human capital are better provided through 
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domestic assets.  Further, hedges with foreign returns implicit in equities of domestic 
firms that have overseas operations are also available.  Second, the gains from global 
diversification can exceed costs involved.  If the costs of acquiring and holding foreign 
equities are sufficiently large, then investors may find it better to keep their savings at 
home.  Third, information is much more easily communicated at a country level.  This 
information superiority enables portfolios solely based on domestic assets to perform 
better than global portfolios.   
The first two arguments do not seem to well generalize to regional level.  
Further if information sharing is also not easier at regional level than at global level, 
then it would be more advantageous to directly go to the global markets and form global 
portfolios.   Hence further liberalization of capital account transactions in the East Asian 
countries is expected to strengthen their financial linkages with developed countries 
more than with one another in the region.  This means that financial liberalization in 
East Asia may not necessarily produce market pressure or incentives to create regional 
financial arrangements such as the Asian Monetary Fund for regional financial 
cooperation and in the long-run a common currency area in East Asia. 
There are also several institutional and structural characteristics of the East 
Asian economies, particularly in the financial systems that have constrained, and are 
likely to limit the extent of regional financial integration in the future.  One of the most 
important characteristics in East Asia is related to underdevelopment of financial 
systems that are largely bank-oriented.  Except for Japanese banks, most of the banks in 
other East Asian countries, which are small in size have a limited access to international 
capital markets relatively limited experience in international corporate banking and a 
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small branch network in East Asia.  By and large, their customer bases are confined to 
domestic borrowers and lenders.   
Bond markets still remain relatively small in size; they are narrow in terms of 
maturity and issues; and are not easily accessible to foreign investors after a decade of 
liberalization.  And the markets for financial derivatives have only recently begun to 
develop in these countries.  There are few domestic investment banks, securities firms, 
and mutual funds that are efficient enough to compete against their counterparts from 
the developed countries.  
 In the absence of these securities market institutions, underwriting securities in 
international capital markets, organizing large syndicated loans, and negotiating 
multinational M&As in East Asia have been dominated by American and European 
investment banks and more so since East Asian countries took steps to open their 
financial markets.  According to the database of International Financing Review, a 
major fraction of financing through debt instruments in East Asian countries are 
undertaken by American and European Investment banks, rather than Asian banks 
(Table ?). Before the crisis, Japanese banks were active in lending to other East Asian 
countries and accounted for the bulk of syndicated loans to these countries.  Since the 
crisis, however, Japanese banks have withdrawn their lending to Asian countries so 
much that it was less than 6 percent of their total external lending in 2001 (See Table 6).  
The dominance of Western investment banks has become more pronounced in recent 
year in East Asia as corporations and financial institutions in the region have 
increasingly sought to raise funds from international capital markets than before with 
deregulation of external financing. 
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Another important hurdle to integrating financial systems in East Asia is 
savings and investment profile that is not matched well within the region.  Throughout 
the 1980’s and until the mid-1990’s, the ASEAN states and Korea were net borrowers 
as they were running deficits on their current accounts.  China, Taiwan, and Japan were, 
on the other hand, accumulating huge amounts of current account surpluses, which 
made East Asia as a whole a net lender financing the bulk of U.S. and European current 
account deficits.  External financing for the East Asia’s deficit countries ultimately 
came from the three East Asia’s surpluses countries, but it was arranged and managed in 
part by Japanese banks, but mostly by western financial institutions.  That is, East Asian 
savers and investors were intermediated by western financial institutions through New 
York and London markets.  Since the outbreak of the crisis in 1997, all of the East 
Asian crisis countries have become net lenders and are likely to continue to do so.  Not 
surprisingly, they have been relying on western financial institutions in investing their 
current account surpluses in foreign securities.  Together with China, Taiwan, and Japan, 
the East Asia has become a larger net saver of the global economy than before, 
financing the bulk of balance of payment deficits of the rest of the world.  In investing 
their surpluses, East Asian countries will continue to rely on international financial 
markets in New York and London, simply because western financial institutions with 
global reach and network are likely to be more efficient in allocating East Asian savings. 
 Hong Kong and Singapore have been two important regional financial centers in 
East Asia.  Have they played any role in driving financial integration in East Asia with 
the onset of financial liberalization in the region?  It should be noted that they were 
serving East Asian borrowers and lenders well before financial market opening got 
underway in the region.  These two centers were essentially outposts of and hence 
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tightly linked with major international capital markets in advanced countries.  The crisis 
in 1997, which almost brought Hong Kong to the brink of collapse, has undermined 
their importance as regional centers as East Asian corporations and banks have 
increasingly moved directly to New York and London markets for their financial service 
needs and transactions.  Hong Kong and Singapore may have gravitated more toward 
linking financially East Asian economies with advanced economies than integrating 
them with one another.   
Most of the East Asian countries have managed to open substantially their 
financial services industries to foreign competitions over the last decade.  Foreign 
financial institutions now receive a national treatment that provides a level playing field 
when they enter financial markets of East Asian countries.  Many western banks have 
established a wide network of branches and subsidiaries throughout East Asia, and so 
have western securities firms, investment banks, insurance companies, and other non-
bank financial institutions.  There are numerous emerging market funds operating out of 
New York to invest in East Asian securities.  There is little doubt that the hold of 
western financial institutions in East Asian has increased since the early 1990s.  This 
pervasive influence of western financial institutions is likely to expand and strengthen 
East Asia’s financial ties with advanced countries with the continuing financial 
liberalization in the region.     
Overtime, local investment banks and other financial institutions may become 
more competitive and new markets for financial derivatives may emerge to the extent 
that they enjoy advantage in collecting and assessing local information for their 
financial activities compared to western institutions.  Such an advantage may disappear 
as a result of the on-going information and communication technology.  On the other 
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hand, the gap in financial technology and expertise between East Asian and Western 
financial institutions is likely to persist.  As a result, borrowers and lenders from East 
Asia are likely to go to the New York and London markets because these markets offer 
low costs of financing and more attractive savings instruments in terms of returns 
adjusted for risks.  Many of the branches and subsidiaries foreign financial institutions 
have no doubt become indigenous institutions, but they are likely to serve as conduits 
for integration of East Asian financial markets with the markets of developed countries.  
Although the odds are against them, countries in East Asia have been working 
together to develop regional financial markets as part of their strategy to deepen 
economic integration in the region.  The Chiang Mai Initiative reflects such regional 
efforts for integration.  In contemplating developing regional financial markets and 
supporting multilateral banks specialized in regional finance in East Asia, East Asian 
policymakers will be faced with answering many questions related to benefits and costs 
of regional financial integration.  Will regional financial markets help improve 
allocation of resources in East Asia?  Will regional financial markets reduce the 
likelihood of recurrence of financial crisis in the future? 
In recent years there have been discussions on the extent of which East Asian 
countries would gain by cooperating in establishing an East Asian regional stock 
exchange and an East Asian regional bond market, focusing more on the latter.  
However, there is no guarantee that a regional bond market in East Asia will be large 
and efficient enough to survive competition against Eurobond or Yankee bond markets.  
Furthermore, a viable East Asian bond market will require establishing beforehand a 
regional financial infrastructure that includes regional credit agencies, clearing and 
settlement systems, cross-border securities borrowing and lending mechanisms, credit 
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enhancement and guarantee agencies, and regional trading mechanisms.  Tax treatments 
for securities transactions will also have to be harmonized at the regional level.  It will 
take many years, if not many decades, for the East countries with diverse legal and 
regulatory systems and at different stages of financial development to resolve their 
differences to establish the requisite financial infrastructure.  Efficiency of the regional 
bond market may also require its integration with global markets. 
In conclusion, it is not clear, at this stage of development, whether further 
financial liberalization would encourage countries in East Asia to form a common 
currency area.  In the long-run, financial integration through liberalization facilitates 
mobility of real capital between countries as evidenced by a large increase in intra-
regional foreign direct investment in recent years, in particular Japanese investment in 
China and ASEAN.  As apposed to this development, there have been strong market 
forces integrating East Asian financial markets into global financial markets.  This trend 
of financial globalization in East Asia has become more noticeable in recent years as a 
result of growing current account surpluses at the regional level and deeper penetration 
of western banking and securities institution of East Asian financial markets.  
Combining these two developments, financial liberalization leaves uncertain as to 
whether it will generate incentives for the East Asian countries to join and remain in an 
Asian currency union, whereas it raises pressures for maintaining their currencies stable 
vis-à-vis global currencies.      
As in trade, however, causality may run from currency union to financial 
integration: that is, a political decision to form a common currency area will unleash 
market forces for further financial integration, contributing to creation of regional 
financial markets.  However, the formation of currency union will not weaken East 
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Asia’s financial linkages with advanced countries.  In deciding whether to form a 
regional currency union, East Asian countries may have to examine closely whether the 
currency union would help develop efficient regional financial markets that could 
survive competition vis-à-vis other global financial markets. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks. 
 
In this paper, we have tried to judge prospects of forming a currency union in East Asia, 
especially focusing on trade integration and financial liberalization occurring in the area. 
There are several interesting findings. First, the region common shocks in East Asia in 
1990s are at least comparable to those in Europe, implying that the East Asian region is 
well prepared for a regional currency union.  Second, two most important determinants 
of business cycle synchronization are intra-region trade share and trade structure 
similarity in the region.  In this regard, increasing share of intra-region trade and the 
pattern of trade structure getting more alike in East Asia are expected to put more 
pressure on forming a currency arrangement.  Third, financial liberalization, which has 
rapidly occurred in this area, tends to lead to more global integration, rather than 
regional integration, of the financial systems.  Therefore, further financial liberalization 
is not likely to encourage East Asian countries to form a regional currency union, rather 
increasing incentives for pegging their currencies to a global currency.  
 More appropriate criteria for a successful currency union, however, are involved 
with how the pattern of trade and financial integration would be shaped after the set up 
of a currency union.  There is some evidence that joining a currency union leads to 
increased trade among member countries, further strengthening the formation of the 
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currency union.   However there is more uncertainty in predicting whether endogenous 
adjustments of financial systems after forming a currency union will act for or against 
the currency union.  It is more likely, though, that at least the currency union does not 
hinder further financial integration among member countries.   
 Other issues are related to the sequence of approaching to the currency union.  It 
has been pointed out that political cooperation and institutionalization are the 
prerequisites for a successful currency union in East Asia.  How the economies in the 
region can proceed smoothly to transform the current exchange rate arrangements into a 
common currency peg, if desirable, will be a critical question. The experiences from the 
European Monetary Union will be especially valuable in this regard.  Further analyses 
in these issues remain to be seen in future research. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Derivation of the State-Space Model. 
 
The state-space/measurement equation form can be represented in two steps.  First, the 
state-space equation represents a transition of unobserved states that, in our model, 
correspond to the three factors, tW , 
r
tR  and jtε .  For the notational purposes, assume 
that there are 1n  countries belonging to region r=1 and 2n  countries belonging to region 
r=2.  Further assume that 21 nnn += .  Then the state-space equation can be represented 
as follows: 
   
ttt FTF ω+⋅= −1  
 
where ),...,,,,( 1
21
ntttttt RRWF εε= ’ and ),...,,,( 121 nttRRWtt ηηηηηω = . 
Second, the measurement equations link the observed variable, output in each country, 
to the states. Let )',...,,,...,( 221
11
1 21 tnttntt
YYYYY =  be an ( 1×n ) vector.  Then the 
measurement equations relate the observed series, output, to the unobserved states and 
can be represented as follows: 
 
 tt FZY ⋅=  
 
where Z is appropriately defined from equation (1) as follows: 
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The estimation of the above model is obtained by maximizing the log likelihood 
function based on the assumption that the errors terms follow normal distribution. 
 
 
B. Finding the Starting Point for the Numerical Maximization. 
 
The model as specified, even under the assumption that the errors are uncorrelated and 
the unobserved factors follow AR(1), includes quite a few number of parameters.  There 
are 4 (for the one world and the three region common factors) + 28 (for the errors) 
parameters for AR(1) coefficients, 28 parameters for the variances of the country-
specific shocks, 28 parameters for the sensitivity coefficients to the world common 
factors and 28 parameters for the sensitivity coefficients to the region common factor, 
summing up to 116 parameters.  Due to the size of the model, it is to the utmost crucial 
to provide good initial parameter values for the numerical maximization of the log-
likelihood function.  
 We have calculated the initial parameter values by mimicking the original model 
as closely as possible.  For example, the parameter values of the impact coefficients on 
factors for each country, wjα  and rjα , are derived from the following equation: 
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 r w rjt wj t rj t jtY Y Yα α ε= + +     (B1) 
 
where rjtY  is the cyclical measure (the growth rate) of output at time t for country j 
belonging to region r, wtY , the cyclical measure (the growth rate) of output at time t for 
the world economy, and rtY , the cyclical measure (the growth rate) of output at time t 
for the region. wtY  is calculated by taking the weighted average of the growth rates, with 
the size of real GDP being used as weights.15  To preserve the orthogonal property 
between factors, instead of using a similarly-calculated regional measure, we have used 
the residuals in the regression of the regional measure on the world measure.  In other 
words, we calculate the weighted average growth rate for a region and, by regressing it 
to wtY , the residual is derived to use for 
r
tY . 
 The parameter values for AR(1) coefficients are calculated by regressing wtY , 
r
tY  and the residuals from equation (B1) on the lagged variables: 
 
  1
w w w
t w t tY Yρ η−= +      (B2) 
  
  1
r r R
t r t rtY Yρ η−= +      (B3) 
                                                 
15 To allow for comparison of the real GDP across countries, we have used the Penn 
World Table developed by Summers and Heston (1991) data set for the available years, 
and extended it using the last year’s value for the unavailable years.   
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  jtjtjjt ηερε += −1      (B4) 
   
Since, in the original model, the innovations to the world common, region-specific 
common, and country-specific factors are normalized to unity, wtY  and 
r
tY  are redefined 
by normalizing the variances of Wtη and Rrtη  to unity, which essentially adjust the 
numerical values of the impact coefficients by the factor of normalization.  The variance 
of the idiosyncratic shocks is derived from the residual in equation (B4). 
 The initial parameter values, while useful for the numerical maximization, are 
meaningful by themselves as an alternative way of decomposing shocks.  Based on the 
initial parameter values, we have also derived the shares of variances accounted for by 
the world common, the region common and the country-specific factors in a similar way 
explained in section 2.  Main results in section 4 preserve without significant 
differences (the results not reported), which confirms that our results are quite robust.
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Table 1.  Shares of Variances Accounted for by World, Region and Country-Specific Factors 
A. Asian Countries 
 Period : 1979-1990     Period : 1991-1999 
 Volatility World Region Country Volatility World Region Country 
China 3.6100 0.5758 0.1605 0.2637 2.2957 (-)0.1390 0.0122 0.8488 
Hong Kong 3.9816 0.0034 (-)0.9966 0 3.5456 (-)0.1782 0.7376 0.0841 
Indonesia 2.1027 (-)0.0012 (-)0.4467 0.5521 7.0028 (-)0.1123 0.8877 0 
Japan 1.0333 0.0487 0.0685 0.8827 2.1536 (-)0.1593 0.4029 0.4378 
Malaysia 3.2142 (-)0.0026 (-)0.1846 0.8128 5.5176 (-)0.1517 0.8449 0.0033 
Philippines 4.7982 (-)0.5088 (-)0.2503 0.2409 2.4575 0.3890 0.5848 0.0262 
Singapore 3.5015 (-)0.0297 (-)0.2870 0.6833 3.5393 (-)0.0537 (-)0.0439 0.9024 
Taiwan 2.5283 0.1716 (-)0.7084 0.1200 0.9027 (-)0.3369 0.2798 0.3834 
Thailand 2.9225 (-)0.0017 (-)0.0020 0.9963 6.3965 (-)0.2804 0.6044 0.1152 
Korea 3.4333 0.0706 (-)0.0209 0.9085 5.0675 (-)0.1268 0.7921 0.0811 
Average 3.1126 0.1414 0.3126 0.5460 3.8878 0.1927 0.5190 0.2882 
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B. European Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Period : 1979 – 1990     Period : 1991-1999 
 Volatility World Region Country Volatility World Region Country 
GERMANY 1.8256 0.4589 0.3171 0.2240 3.8391 (-)0.3179 0.5483 0.1338 
AUSTRIA 1.5809 0.0011 0.4014 0.5975 0.9526 (-)0.0045 0.6929 0.3027 
BELGIUM 1.4922 0.0808 0.5337 0.3855 1.4522 0.2430 0.4471 0.3098 
DENMARK 1.8855 0.3919 (-)0.0015 0.6066 1.5585 0.4895 0.0002 0.5103 
FRANCE 1.1560 (-)0.0089 0.4064 0.5847 1.2350 0.2857 0.4727 0.2416 
IRELAND 1.9091 0.0334 0.1746 0.7920 3.1703 0.8006 0.0869 0.1125 
ITALY 1.4322 0.2668 0.7332 0 1.0678 0.3067 0.4070 0.2863 
NETHERLANDS 1.9617 0.6040 0.1263 0.2697 2.1248 0.4617 0.2916 0.2467 
FINLAND 1.6946 0.0164 0.7232 0.2604 4.3433 0.9971 (-)0.0029 0 
GREECE 1.7241 0.2189 0.2381 0.5430 1.5514 0.2670 0.2484 0.4846 
NORWAY 2.0168 0.4568 0.0128 0.5304 1.4274 0.1276 (-)0.0747 0.7977 
PORTUGAL 2.6879 (-)0.2848 0.4040 0.3112 2.1692 0.2310 0.6399 0.1291 
SPAIN 1.8680 (-)0.0198 0.0245 0.9558 1.5810 0.3793 0.6207 0 
SWEDEN 1.1410 0.5292 0.2472 0.2236 2.4256 0.7206 0.1191 0.1603 
SWITZERLAND 1.7243 0.1720 0.2148 0.6132 1.0602 0.2346 0.2718 0.4936 
UNITED KINGDOM 2.2166 0.0432 0.0528 0.9040 1.7657 0.7558 (-)0.1486 0.0956 
Average 1.7698 0.1861 0.2882 0.4876 1.9828 0.4139 0.3171 0.2690 
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Table 2. Determinants of Output Co-Movements among European Countries 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (intra-region trade)  0.7638 0.7380 0.8089 
  (0.3716) (0.3817) (0.3722) 
Log (trade structure   1.9947 1.5965 1.3739 
  similarity)  (0.6518) (0.7557) (0.7350) 
Log (industry structure  1.6814  0.8569 0.8017 
  similarity) (1.0987)  (1.0868) (1.0903) 
Log (per capita GDP -0.0753  -0.0589 -0.0484 
difference (0.0753)  (0.0819) (0.0809) 
Log (per capita GDP) -0.2218 -0.7803 -0.7454 -0.5602 
 (0.2326) (0.3065) (0.3291) (0.2819) 
Dummy for the 1990s 0.0861 0.0818 0.0966  
 (0.0924) (0.0904) (0.0924)  
Constant 1.1482 3.3422 3.2534 2.7697 
 (0.5467) (1.0116) (1.0388) (0.9498) 
Number of obs. 30 30 30 30 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.20 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the fraction of the output variation attributable to regional 
common shocks for 15 European countries in each of the periods 1979-1989, and 1990-1999. 
Random effects specification is applied to the panel data for the two ten-year periods. Standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Determinants of Output Co-Movements in East Asian Economies 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log (intra-region  -0.4003 -0.3637 0.1245 0.0656 
  (0.3448) (0.7043) (0.8473) (0.6563) 
Log (trade structure  -0.2323 -0.2042 1.7747 2.0635 
similarity)  (0.7257) (0.9823) (0.8786) (0.9153) 
Log (industry structure 2.2269  0.3125 3.2847 1.9430 
similarity) (2.2240)  (4.3855) (5.2828) (4.0861) 
Log (per capita GDP  0.0499  0.1159 0.2087 0.2356 
Difference) (0.0886)  (0.1157) (0.1162) (0.1078) 
Log (per capita GDP) -0.0875 -0.1314 -0.1271 -0.0033 0.3772 
 (0.1013) (0.1065) (0.1275) (0.1489) (0.1188) 
Dummy for the 1990s 0.7937 0.9341 0.9161  -0.0819 
 (0.1747) (0.2370) (0.3146)  (0.2931) 
Constant 0.4773 -0.6555 -0.5181 2.2743 1.7663 
 (0.6661) (0.4468) (1.7645) (1.8346) (1.6440) 
Number of obs. 20 20 20 20 20 
R2 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.39 0.58 
 
Notes In columns (1)-(4) the dependent variable is the fraction of the region-wide common 
movements in national output variation for 10 Asian countries in each of the periods 1979-1989, 
and 1990-1999. In column (5) the dependent variable is replaced by the estimates of the shares 
of regional common shocks corresponding to the periods 1978-1987, and 1988-1996. See the 
notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4. Trends of Intra-region Trade in East Asia and Europe 
 
 
Intra-region Trade 
(percentage of total trade) 
 1980 1990 2000 
East Asia    
China 42.4 58.9 48.7 
Hong Kong 46.7 60.4 64.1 
Indonesia 62.6 56.8 54.4 
Japan 23.8 28.0 38.1 
Korea 32.7 34.2 42.2 
Malaysia 49.2 55.1 56.1 
Philippines 37.4 40.0 46.5 
Singapore 49.4 50.7 57.5 
Taiwan 34.9 43.1 50.9 
Thailand 40.1 47.5 54.2 
Average 41.9 47.5 51.3 
    
Europe    
Austria 69.8 75.6 71.0 
Belgium 74.9 80.4 72.5 
Denmark 74.4 75.5 74.8 
Finland 57.4 66.6 61.7 
France 57.8 67.1 66.7 
Germany 63.9 67.4 59.1 
Greece 48.2 70.1 56.1 
Ireland 77.6 76.1 61.3 
Italy 56.1 67.3 59.1 
Netherlands 70.5 77.0 67.3 
Norway 78.6 75.2 73.7 
Portugal 58.7 78.5 78.6 
Spain 43.2 68.2 67.8 
Sweden 73.8 78.9 68.4 
Switzerland 69.0 72.1 66.9 
United Kingdom 55.8 62.8 57.0 
Average 64.4 72.4 66.4 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
Note: Intra-region trade is measured by the share of an economy’s trade with the rest of the 
economies that belong the same region, in total trade. 
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Table 5. Trends of Trade Similarity Index among East Asia and European 
Economies 
 
 Index 
 1980 1990 2000 
East Asia    
China 0.476 0.591 0.629 
Hong Kong 0.436 0.603 0.636 
Indonesia 0.379 0.442 0.512 
Japan 0.357 0.480 0.606 
Korea 0.490 0.628 0.662 
Malaysia 0.482 0.542 0.651 
Philippines 0.438 0.586 0.659 
Singapore 0.453 0.523 0.623 
Taiwan 0.514 0.620 0.703 
Thailand 0.488 0.589 0.686 
Average 0.451 0.560 0.637 
    
Europe    
Austria 0.646 0.674 0.703 
Belgium 0.664 0.662 --- 
Denmark 0.613 0.622 0.643 
Finland 0.697 0.572 0.559 
France 0.706 0.703 0.716 
Germany 0.668 0.696 0.706 
Greece 0.488 0.438 0.490 
Ireland 0.581 0.583 0.518 
Italy 0.655 0.651 0.663 
Netherlands 0.621 0.668 0.687 
Norway 0.609 0.590 0.611 
Portugal 0.539 0.523 0.588 
Spain 0.669 0.654 0.661 
Sweden 0.616 0.647 0.660 
Switzerland --- --- --- 
United Kingdom 0.664 0.691 0.702 
Average 0.629 0.625 0.636 
--- Not available. 
Source: Constructed from the World Bank Trade and Production Database (which is originally 
from United Nations’ Comtrade Database) 
 
Note: The index measures the extent of similitude in the composition of total merchandise 
exports excluding agricultural products at the three-digit SITC level between an economy and 
the rest of the economies in the same region. It is an unweighted average of bilateral similarity 
indices. The index ranges between 0 and 1 (most similar).    
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Table 6. Distribution of International Bank Lending 
 
(million US dollars) 
 1996.6 1999.12 2001.6 
 
European 
banks 
American 
banks 
Japanese 
banks 
European 
banks 
American 
banks 
Japanese 
banks 
European 
banks 
American 
banks 
Japanese 
banks 
Developed 84697 13906 26526 2885881 367998 545636 3377764 497028 728725 
Countries (0.183) (0.106) (0.159) (0.787) (0.676) (0.688) (0.824) (0.704) (0.752) 
          
Asia 127682 35594 115471 132817 26793 65050 96156 29042 51934 
 (0.276) (0.272) (0.693) (0.036) (0.049) (0.082) (0.023) (0.041) (0.054) 
          
Indonesia 18076 3963 21622 20600 4096 12491 15762 4073 9626 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.130) (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
          
Korea 26859 10451 22512 24449 8829 12592 16953 5988 10110 
 (0.058) (0.080) (0.135) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) 
          
Malaysia 7872 1973 8131 8275 1419 6029 7184 2404 5843 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.049) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
          
Philippines 4698 3774 1402 8835 3003 2921 6643 1891 3066 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
Thailand 18092 5456 37552 11929 826 13075 8091 1358 7979 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.225) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
          
Total 462230 130975 166701 3665913 544124 792676 4099965 705569 969425 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
 
Note: American banks are the United States and Canadian banks. 
